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ABSTRACT
With the spread of social networks and their unfortunate use for
hate speech, automatic detection of the laer has become a press-
ing problem. In this paper, we reproduce seven state-of-the-art
hate speech detection models from prior work, and show that they
perform well only when tested on the same type of data they were
trained on. Based on these results, we argue that for successful
hate speech detection, model architecture is less important than
the type of data and labeling criteria. We further show that all
proposed detection techniques are brile against adversaries who
can (automatically) insert typos, changeword boundaries or add in-
nocuous words to the original hate speech. A combination of these
methods is also effective against Google Perspective – a cuing-
edge solution from industry. Our experiments demonstrate that
adversarial training does not completely mitigate the aacks, and
using character-level featuresmakes themodels systematicallymore
aack-resistant than using word-level features.
1 INTRODUCTION
Social networking has changed the way people communicate on-
line. While the ability of ordinary people to reach thousands of
others instantenously undoubtedly has positive effects, downsides
like polarization via echo chambers [13] have become apparent.
is inter-connectedness of people allows malicious entities to in-
fluence opinions by posting hateful material, also known as hate
speech.
Hate speech is not a universal concept. While laws targeting
speech seen as harmful have existed throughout human civiliza-
tion, the specific term was originally coined in the US in 1989 to
address problems of “harmful racist speech” that was nonetheless
protected in the US [4]. In 1997, the European Union defined “hate
speech” as texts that “spread, incite, promote or justify racial ha-
tred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on
intolerance.”1 Hate speech can be separated from merely offensive
or shocking content [7], although this distinction is non-trivial. In
this paper, we denote non-hateful speech as “ordinary speech.”
Typically, hate speech detection is cast as a classification prob-
lem. Standard machine learning algorithms are used to derive a
discriminative function that can separate hate speech from ordi-
nary speech. Although several hate speech detection mechanisms
have been reported in the research literature [24], to the best of
1hps://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS Hate speech ENG.pdf
our knowledge, there has so far been no systematic empirical eval-
uation comparing actual implementations of proposed models and
datasets.
We study five recent model architectures presented in four pa-
pers. One architecture [29] is trained separately on three different
datasets, giving us seven models in total. Six of these distinguish
between two classes [1, 28, 29]. One classifies among three, distin-
guishing between offensive and non-offensive ordinary speech [7].
Two models are character-based [28] (using character n-grams as
features) while the rest are word-based (using word n-grams or em-
beddings). In the original papers, each of the two-class models was
evaluated using a particular dataset. We show that none of the pre-
trained models perform well when tested with any other dataset.
is suggests that the features indicative of hate speech are not
consistent across different datasets. However, we also show that
all models perform equally well if they are retrained with the train-
ing set from another dataset and tested using the test set from the
same dataset. is suggests that hate speech detection is largely
independent of model architecture. We also tested each two-class
model on offensive ordinary speech [7], and observe that they tend
to classify it as hate speech. is indicates that the models fail
to distinguish between hate speech and offensive ordinary speech,
making them susceptible to false positives. We experimented with
using a transfer learning approach [12]. Using a pre-trained lan-
guage model, we fine-tuned it for the classification tasks, and con-
ducted the same experiments. We show that the results are com-
parable but do not exceed the baselines.
Prior work has only considered what can be called naive adver-
saries, who do not aempt to circumvent detection. We show that
all the models are vulnerable to adversarial inputs. ere are many
ways of aacking text-based detection models. A simple aack in-
volves changing the input text so that a human reader will still get
the intended meaning, while detection models misclassify the text.
We suggest three such alteration techniques, all of which are eas-
ily automated: (i) word changes, (ii) word-boundary changes, and
(iii) appending unrelated innocuous words. Implementing two va-
rieties of each aack, we show that all detection models are vul-
nerable to them, although to different extents.
Combining two of our most effective aacks, we present a sim-
ple but powerful evasion method, which completely breaks all word-
based models, and severely hinders the performance of character-
based models. In addition, this aack significantly degreades the
performance of Google Perspective API,2 which assigns a “toxic-
ity” score to input text.
2hps://www.perspectiveapi.com/
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• efirst experimental comparative analysis of state-of-the-
art hate speech detection models and datasets (Section 2).
• Several aacks against effective against all models and pos-
sible mitigations (Sections 3).
• Asimple but effective evasionmethod that completely breaks
all word-based classifiers, and significantly impacts character-
based classifiers aswell as Google Perspective (Section 4.4).
• A review of the limitations in current methds, and desider-
ata for future developments (Section 7, Section 5).
2 REPLICATION AND MODEL COMPARISON
We begin by describing four recent papers [1, 7, 28, 29] on hate
speech detection (Section 2.1). We reproduce and systematically
analyze the performance of seven models presented in these pa-
pers (Section 2.2). e datasets focus on partially disjoint aspects
of ”hate”: e.g., hate speech based on religion or ethnicity [29] may
not be highly similar to sexually connotated hate speech [1]. As
all datasets except one are drawn from Twier, they do not prop-
erly represent the range of online text. We believe future research
should focus on collecting and properly evaluating datasets, espe-
cially outside Twier.
We tested the performance of all pre-trainedmodels against four
datasets. We further re-trained the proposedmodels on each of the
other three datasets, and compared the results. All model architec-
tures performed comparably well, when the training set and test
set were taken from the same dataset. However, our results indi-
cate that hate speech detection is highly context-dependent and
transfers poorly across datasets.
2.1 Models and datasets
In this section, we describe all replicated models and their respec-
tive datasets. e datasets, labelled W, T1, T1*, T2, and T3, are
summarized in Table 1, and Table 2 provides additional statistics
on sentence lengths. All datasets were divided between a training
set used to train the model, and a test set used for measuring model
performace.
Each paper proposes a different machine learning model for
hate speech detection: two papers use feature extraction -based
models [7, 28] and two use recurrent neural networks [1, 29]. All
models lowercase content and remove punctuation. We summa-
rize the models and datasets in Table 3, and discuss them in the
remainder of this section.
W [28]: As a part of Wikipedia’s “Detox” project targeting per-
sonal aacks in Wikipedia’s edit comments, Wulczyn et al. [28]
experimented with logistic regression (LR) and multilayer percep-
tron (MLP) models, using n-gram features on both the character-
and word-level. Word n-gram sizes ranged from 1 to 3, and char-
acter n-gram sizes from 1 to 5. Labels were gathered via crowd-
sourcing, each comment being labeled by 10 evaluators. We de-
note this dataset as W. Wulczyn et al. made their tests on both
the one-hot encoded majority vote between the two classes (at-
tack or non-aack), and empirical distributions based on different
votes. e former gives a classification, whereas the laer may
be interpreted as class probabilities. On one-hot encoded labels,
Dataset Domain Classes (size) Source
W Wikipedia
personal aacks (13590)
[28]
ordinary (102274)
T1 Twier
hate speech (1430)
[7]offensive (19190)
ordinary (4163)
T1* Twier
hateful (1430)
[7]
offensive ∪ ordinary (23353)
T2 Twier
racist ∪ sexist (5013)
[27]
ordinary (10796)
T3 Twier
hateful/racist (414)
[29]
ordinary (2021)
Table 1: Datasets used in our replication. Union (∪) denotes
the conflation of class elements.
Dataset Mean Std. Min. Max. 25% 50% 75%
W 84 161 1 9949 20 42 89
T1, T1* 20 12 1 321 11 18 27
T2 20 8 1 45 14 21 26
T3 20 7 1 48 16 21 25
Table 2: Sentence lengths in the datasets.
Model Dataset(s) Source
LR char W [28]
MLP char W [28]
LR word T1 [7]
CNN+GRU T1*, T2, T3 [29]
LSTM T2 [1]
Table 3: Replicated machine learning models.
character-models performed beer both in the original paper and
our replication. We therefore use these models in our tests.
T1 [7]: Davidson et al. [7] presented a dataset with three kinds
of comments from Twier: hate speech, offensive but non-hateful
speech, and neither. is is, to our knowledge, the only dataset
with such a distinction. e hate speech data was collected by
searching for tweets with known hate speech phrases,3 and further
labeling these tweets with amajority vote from three CrowdFlower
workers each . We denote this dataset as T1. A vast majority of the
dataset contains offensive speech (76%), and only a small portion
actual hate speech (5%). Davidson et al. use a word-based logistic
regression (LR) classifier (1 − 3-grams), which we replicated.
T2 [1]: In their paper,Wulczyn et al. [28] mention that futurework
should involve the use of deep neural networks (DNNs), which
have proven useful in a number of text classification tasks [10].
Currently, the dominant approaches to text classification use re-
current neural networks (RNNs), and in particular long short-term
memory (LSTM) networks. ese are applied for hate speech clas-
sification by Badjatiya et al. [1], who use them both alone and with
3e phrases were collected from hps://www.hatebase.org/
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gradient-boosting decision trees (GBDTs). For the laer, they first
train the LSTMon the training data, and then use the average of the
word embeddings learned by the LSTM as the input for the GBDT.
ey report a major increase in performance when compared with
only using LSTMs. However, we were unable to replicate these
results with the code they provide,4 and received a beer score us-
ing only the LSTM. erefore, we use the LSTM alone instead of
LSTM+GBDT. Like Badjatiya et al., we initialize the word embed-
ding layer randomly.
As data, Badjatiya et al. use a corpus of 16000 tweets originally
collected by Waseem et al. [27]. ese contain three possible la-
bels: “racism”, “sexism”, and “neither”. In our experiments, we
combined the “racism” and “sexism” classes into one, comprising
general hateful material. We denote this dataset as T2.
T1*, T3 [29]: In addition to LSTMs, convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) have been popular in text classification research. Badjatiya
et al. [1] experiment with them, as do Zhang et al. [29]. e laer
add CNNs and RNNs together, by giving the output of a CNN to
a gated recurrend unit (GRU) network. Word embeddings were
initialized with Google word vectors trained on news data.5
Zhang et al. [29] use dataset T1 from Davidson et al. [7], but
combine offensive and ordinary speech into one category, as op-
posed to genuine hate speech. We denote this dataset as T1*. Zhang
et al. further created their own small dataset of hate speech tar-
geted toward refugees and muslims, which we denote as T3. Fi-
nally, in addition to T1* and T3, they experimented with T2. We
replicate all three experiments, resulting in three distinct CNN+GRU
models.
2.2 Model performance
In this section, we present replications of the original models (Sec-
tion 2.2.1), and cross-apply all two-class models to all two-class
datasets (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Replication and re-training. In the original papers, the hy-
perparameters of each model have been optimized to the particular
training sets used. However, we additionally trained each model
with every dataset, and compared the results. As reported in Ta-
ble 4, all models perform comparably on all four datasets.
Model
Dataset
W T1* T2 T3
LR char 0.86 0.63 0.82 0.85
MLP char 0.86 0.63 0.81 0.85
CNN+GRU 0.87 0.70 0.83 0.81
LSTM 0.85 0.64 0.78 0.79
Table 4: F1-scores (macro-averagedacross classes) of the two-
class models trained and evaluated on each dataset (datasets
used in original papers in bold).
e results indicate that themodels are roughly equally effective
when applied to different texts, provided that they were trained
using the same kind of text.
4hps://github.com/pinkeshbadjatiya/twier-hatespeech
5hps://github.com/mmihaltz/word2vec-GoogleNews-vectors
Inferior performance on T1* by all models can be explained by
two factors. First, the dataset is highly imbalanced, with the “hate”
class taking up only 5% of the training set. Second, this dataset
is derived from Davidson et al.’s original three-class corpus that
separates offensive speech from hate speech. To constrain classi-
fication into only two categories, T1* assimilates the “offensive”
and “non-hate” classes into one. Of these, the offensive class dom-
inates, covering roughly 80% of the combined class in the training
set. It may have more overlap with hate speech than non-offensive
speech, making classification more challenging.
2.2.2 Cross-application between datasets. To estimate the adap-
tivity of models pre-trained with one dataset, we applied them to
all test sets. We first trained eachmodel with the training data used
in the original paper presenting it, and then applied the resulting
classifier to the test sets of all four datasets.
Model, training dataset
Dataset
W T1* T2 T3
LR char, W (0.86) 0.37 0.50 0.24
MLP char, W (0.86) 0.38 0.50 0.25
CNN+GRU, T1* 0.11 (0.70) 0.48 0.51
CNN+GRU, T2 0.14 0.28 (0.83) 0.44
CNN+GRU, T3 0.13 0.48 0.50 (0.81)
LSTM, T2 0.23 0.33 (0.78) 0.47
Table 5: F1-scores (macro-averaged) of pre-trained two-class
models applied to different test sets, with the original test
set in parentheses.
As we can observe from the results reported in Table 5, none of
the pre-trained models transfer well to any other dataset. ese
results indicate that linguistic hate speech indicators are not well
retained across different datasets. is may be due to the lack of
words shared between datasets, or differences between the rele-
vant features of particular subcategories of hate speech.
2.3 Offensive speech vs. hate speech
An important distinction can be drawn between hate speech and
speech that uses offensive vocabulary without being hateful. e
laer is separated from hate speech in Davidson et al.’s dataset
T1 [7]. Especially given the lack of any precise definition of hate
speech in either legal or academic contexts, it is important to in-
vestigate the extent to which existing approaches are sensitive to
the hateful-offensive distinction.
A particular concern is the extent to which two-class models as-
sign offensive but non-hateful text to the “hate” class. is can be
treated as a false positive, assuming the hateful-offensive distinc-
tion is appropriate. Of course, the assumption is not always clear:
for instance, Google Perspective6 offers to detect “toxic” comments;
but whether “toxicity” should include all offensive text remains a
subjective assesment.
To estimate the performance of themodels on offensive but non-
hateful text, we applied the “offensive” datapoints fromT1’s test set
to all two-class models, except CNN+GRU trained on T1*, which
6hps://www.perspectiveapi.com/
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is built from T1 and hence not independent of the task. As seen in
Table 6, CNN+GRU trained on T3 was the only model to succeed
in this task. All other models performed on a random or below-
random level.
Model, training dataset Assignment to non-hate
LR char, W [28] 0.40
MLP char, W [28] 0.36
CNN+GRU, T2 [29] 0.23
CNN+GRU, T3 [29] 0.89
LSTM, T2 [1] 0.36
Table 6: Performance of two-class models on offensive but
non-hateful speech.
Additional experimentation revealed that the seeming success
of CNN+GRU trained on T3was due to the prevalence of unknown
words in the “offensive” test set, mapped to the unknown token
(<unk>). is token was associated with the non-hateful class
in the model, and on average over 40% of words per sentence in
this test set were mapped to it. Hence, the performance simply
reflected the model’s small vocabulary.
e results are suggestive of the problematic and subjective na-
ture of what should be considered “hateful” in particular contexts.
As the labels have been manually gathered via crowd-sourcing,
there is no guarantee that labels from different people were consis-
tent. Within datasets, this problem has can be addressed to some
extent by majority voting, but there is no method of guarantee-
ing agreement between datasets. It seems that the labeling in the
two-class models represents offensiveness more than hatefulness
as such.
Manual experimentation suggests similar conclusions concern-
ing Google Perspective. Some examples of Perspective’s scores
on non-hateful sentences appended with a common English curse-
word (marked with “F” here, but in original form in the actual ex-
periment) are presented in Table 7.
Sentence→Modified sentence Old→ New score
You are great→ You are F great 0.03→ 0.82
I love you→ I F love you 0.02→ 0.77
I am so tired→ I am F tired 0.06→ 0.85
Oh damn! → Oh F! 0.64→ 0.96
Food is amazing→ Food is F amazing 0.02→ 0.68
Table 7: Google Perspective “toxicity” scores on non-hateful
sentences with and without a curse word.
None of the examples in Table 7 are hateful, but the curse-laden
variants are all considered “toxic” with a high likelihood. Clearly
“toxicity”, as Perspective currently classifies it, is not assimilable to
hate speech in any substantive (or legal) sense.
2.4 Transfer learning
e replicated models use both classical machine learning meth-
ods, andmore recent deep neural networks (DNNs). Recently, trans-
fer learning has been argued to improve performance text classifi-
cation [12]. is approach to deep learning is based on fine-tuning
a pre-trained model for a particular task, instead of training the
entire model from scratch. A natural question to ask is whether
performance on our datasets could be improved by using transfer
learning.
We implemented a particular transfer learning method called
ULMFiT [12], based on the code the authors provide.7 e model
uses a language-model pre-trained on a large dataset fromWikipedia
[17], fine-tunes it for a particular dataset, and then fine-tunes a
classifier on top of the language-model. We refer the reader to the
original paper for technical details [12].
Our preliminary results indicate that ULMFiT is unable to reach
the baselines from the replicated models. On the Twier datasets
T1–T3, ULMFiT results (0.62, 0.75, 0.80) remained below all respec-
tive baselines (0.66, 0.84, 0.86). However, more systematic evalua-
tion of transfer learning is needed in future research, and we are
currently working on this question.
2.5 Summary of replication and
cross-application
All four two-class models perform highly similarily when trained
on each of the four datasets. In particular, neither the features
used (characters vs. words) or model complexity influenced the
test score in any significant way. is suggests that the features
learned by all models (including LSTM and GRU models) are simi-
lar to relatively simple n-grams, as opposed to involving more com-
plex relations between features.
3 ATTACKS
Adversary model e goal of the adversary we consider in our
work is to fool a detection model into classifying hate speech input
as ordinary speech. We assume that the adversary has complete
control of the input and can modify it to evade detection while
retaining the semantic content of the original hate speech. We do
not assume that the adversary has whitebox access to the model
parameters. e adversary model is relaxed in one aack, where
some knowledge of the training set is required.
Classifiers that rely on surface-level features can be aacked
with malformed input, constituting evasion aacks [15]. In this
section we describe six evasion aacks against the seven classi-
fiers we replicated. All aacks are based around altering input text
with easily implementable and automatic methods. We categorize
the aacks into three types, and experiment with two alternatives
from each:
• Word changes
1. Inserting typos
2. Leetspeak [22]
• Word-boundary changes
1. Inserting whitespace
2. Removing whitespace
7hps://github.com/fastai/fastai
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• Word appending
1. Appending common words
2. Appending non-hateful words
We differentiate the aack types, because they target distinct (al-
beit sometimes overlapping) aspects of the classifier. Word changes
are done to change the identities of words. For word-level mod-
els, the new identities are likely to become “unknown” (i.e. non-
identified tokens denoted by <unk>), while retaining the readabil-
ity and semantic content of the original text to a maximal extent
from a human reader’s perspective. Word boundary changes, on
the other hand, not only alter word identities but also the sentence
structure from a superficial perspective. Finally, word appending
makes no alterations to the original text, but only adds unrelated
material to confuse classification.
ere are theoretical reasons to believe certain aacks to be
more effective against some classifiers than others. In particular, as
word tokenization plays no role in character-models, it is clear that
these are less susceptible to word-boundary changes than word-
models. Furthermore, character-models are expected to be more
resistant to word changes, as many character n-grams are still re-
tained aer the transformations are applied. In contrast, all word-
based models are expected to be vulnerable to aacks that alter
word identities (i.e. bothword changes andword-boundary changes).
Word appending aacks, in contrast, have no a priori reason to
work beer against character- than word-based models, or vice
versa.
We applied the aacks to all seven classifiers, by transforming
the hate class samples from the respective test sets.
3.1 Word changes
Word change aacks introducemisspellings or alternative spellings
into words. ey may make words entirely unrecognizeable to
word-based models, and change the distribution of characters in
character-based classification.
In 2017, Hosseini et al. [11] showed that Google’s “toxicity”
indicator Perspective could be deceived by typos. However, Per-
spective has since been updated, and the examples the authors
provided no longer succeed to the extent they did then. We re-
view these results in Section 4.4. Still, we consider the proposal to
be worth further investigation with larger datasets and automatic
typo-generation.
In addition to typos, we also consider a simplified variety of leet-
speak, which is a type of Internet slang replacing characters with
numbers. Different variants may involve more alterations, but we
only consider character-to-number alterations here. Leetspeak has
been shown to be easily readable to humans [22], but will be unrec-
ognizable to word-models unless it is also present in the training
set.
3.1.1 Algorithms. Inserting typos: As an aack, typo gener-
ation has three desiderata: (i) reducing the detection likelihood
of hate speech, (ii) avoiding correction by automatic spell check-
ers, and (iii) retaining the readability and meaning of the original
text. If the second goal is not met, the defender can include a spell-
checker as a pre-processing stage in the classification. Satisfying
the third goal requires the word to remain recognizable, and not
to be mapped to some other word in the reader’s mental lexicon.
To make the aack succesful, word-level changes must not only
fool the classifier, but be human-readable and retain the original
interpretation to a maximal extent. is means that we cannot
simply introduce typos via random changes to words. Instead, the
change must have minimal impact on readability. We utilize the
empirical finding from cognitive psychology that characters in the
middle of words have a smaller effect on readability than the first
and last characters [23]. To maximize understandability, we re-
stricted the alterations to a single switch between two characters.
e algorithm switches the order of two characters in the word,
excluding the first and final character. e probability of choos-
ing particular characters is calculated by two factors: characters
closer to the middle of the word are preferred, and characters that
are close to each other are preferred. First, a character is chosen be-
tween the second and second-to-last character of the word, based
on a Gaussian distribution centering in the middle. Hence, only
words with four of more characters are applicable. Next, a sec-
ond character is chosen based on the combined effect of the first
distribution and a second Gaussian distribution centered around
the previously chosen word. Two random non-edge characters
are consequently chosen, favoring characters in the middle of the
word. ese characters are then switched to create the typo.
Leetspeak: To transform original text into simple leetspeak, we
introduce the following character replacements:
(a: 4) (e: 3) (l: 1) (o: 0) (s: 5).
e changes retain readability well, given the visual similarity
between the original and leet characters [22].
3.1.2 Mitigation. We tried twomethods of improving classifier
performance on test data modified via word changes: adversarial
training, and adding a spell checker to test set pre-processing.
Adversarial training:Weaugmented the training setwith stochas-
tically transformed versions of the original training examples, for
all classes (doubling the training set size). e purpose of adver-
sarial training was to add transformed varieties of each word into
the model’s vocabulary, making it more likely for the model to as-
sociate them with the correct class.
e random nature of the typo-algorithm limits the scalability
of the approach with long words, as the range of possible typos
becomes larger. In contrast, given the deterministic nature of our
leetspeak algorithm, we can expect adversarial training to work
well against it.
Spell checking: We added a spell-checker to the pre-processing
stage of the test set to find out how resistant our typo-introduction
algorithmwas to automatic correction. We used Python’s Autocor-
rect library for this.
3.2 Word boundary changes
e tokenization aack differs fromword transformation by retain-
ing word-internal characters, but introducing or removing charac-
ters that result in aword-basedmodel separating between different
tokens. We use space as the most evident choice.
3.2.1 Algorithms. We implemented two simple algorithms for
introducing or removing whitespace. We predict removal to be
more effective against word-based models on theoretical grounds.
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Character-based models are likely not highly susceptible to either
variant.
Insertingwhitespace:Word-basedmodels rely on tokenizing the
text into a sequence of words, based on characters treated as word-
separators. erefore, a simple way to makewords unrecognizable
is to change the tokenization by introducing additional separators
between words. e effect of this aack on readability is small, but
it results in most words becoming unrecognized by the classifier.
We used a simple approach of spliing each (content-)word into
two by randomly selecting a character from the word and adding
a space before it. In a word-based model a previously recognized
word will turn into <unk> <unk>.
Removing whitespace: Conversely, removing all spaces leaves
a single <unk> datapoint. Word-based models’ performance will
then depend entirely on how this single token is classified. Character-
models, in contrast, will only lose the information related to the
space token, which might deteriorate their performance, but likely
not much.
is aack has a marked negative impact on surface-level read-
ability, but still allows the reader to recover the original content.
We take the adversary’s main goal to be geing his/her message
across to their target, even if this required some effort on other end.
As English sentences are rarely reformulable into other grammati-
cal sentences only by changing whitespace distribution, ambiguity
does not arise and information loss is marginal.
3.2.2 Mitigation. Adversarial training: For the whitespace
insertion aack, we appended the training set with randomly split
versions of the original data to include word-parts into the model’s
vocabulary (thus doubling the training set). Given that an n char-
acter word can be split in two inn−1 possible ways, going through
all possible combinations of splits in a sentence quickly results in
a combinatory explosion. Hence, the effect of adversarial training
is expected to be limited on analytic grounds.
For completeness, we also conducted adversarial training via
space removal, although this is close to useless on the grounds that
it only adds whole comments as single words to the model vocabu-
lary, and associates them with one class. As this method can only
have an effect if it encounters the exact comment again, it cannot
scale and hence its relevance is close to none inword-basedmodels.
Character-models, in contrast, can make use of it, but its inclusion
is mostly redundant, as the datapoints are not changed much in
comparison to the originals.
Removing spaces Another mitigation method is available only
for character-based models, where spaces are removed from both
training and test data at the pre-processing stage. is method
will by necessity remove any effect of adding spaces, but will also
remove potentially relevant information from the data, as one com-
mon character is removed entirely. e effectiveness of this mitiga-
tion method thus depends on the relevance of the space character
for the classification.
3.3 Word appending
All text classification is based on the prevalence of class-indicating
properties in the data. erefore, adding material that is indicative
of one class oven another makes it more likely for the classifier
to assign the sample to that class. In many tasks this is appro-
priate, but hate speech detection constitutes an important excep-
tion. Hate speech and non-hate speech are not reversible: adding
hateful material to ordinary speech will turn the text into hate
speech, whereas adding non-hateful material to hate speech may
not change its status. is vulnerability invites a possible aack,
where non-hateful material is inserted to hate speech to change
the classification.
For our aack model, we assume that the adversary is aware of
the use of additional unrelated words to distract automatic classi-
fiers. Assuming also that the beginning of the additional material
is clear enough from the discourse, readability and semantic retain-
ment are secured.
3.3.1 Algorithms. We generated a randomnumber (between 10
and 50) orwords at the end of each text in the “hate” class of the test
set. e words were randomly chosen from two possible sources,
yielding two varieties of the aack.
Appending common English words: Google has provided a list
containing the most common words appearing in a large book cor-
pus [18]. We used random words from the top 1000 of these words,
excluding stopwords. e rationale behind this aack is that it re-
quires no knowledge of the training data on the part of the aacker.
Further, the common English words are likely to be contained in
the training corpus of many different datasets.
Appending common ”non-hate” words: Here, we assume the
aacker knows, or correctly guesses, a list of words in the training
data’s non-hateful class. He then appends the text with randomly
chosen common (content) words from this class. We are still not
assuming white-box access to the model itself.
4 RESULTS
We performed our six aacks on each of the seven model-dataset
combinations replicated from prior work. is yields 42 aacks in
total. We used adversarial training to mitigate all aacks, and tried
additional defence methods for the typo aack (spell-checking)
and tokenization aacks (space removal in training; this method
is only available for character-models).
Aack effectiveness varied betweeen models and datasets, but
the performance of all seven hate speech classifiers was signifi-
cantly decreased by most aacks. Word-based models were most
affected by tokenization changes, and character-based models by
word appending. A significant difference betweenword- and character-
based models was that the former were all completely broken by
at least one aack, whereas the laer were never completely bro-
ken. e two character-models performed comparably across all
aacks.
e training dataset had a major influence on aack resilience,
as demonstrated by the differences between the CNN+GRU model
trained with T2 and T3, respectively. However, CNN+GRU trained
on T2 was more resilient to all aacks than LSTM trained on T2,
indicating that model choice also had an effect.
e results from all aacks and their mitigation are presented
in Table 8. Since our aacks affect datapoints in the “hate” class,
we only report the F1-scores from this class.
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Model, DS Orig.
Word changes Boundary changes Word appending
Typos Leet Insert Remove Common Non-hate
A AT SC A AT A AT RW A AT RW A AT A AT
LR char, W 0.75 0.60 0.71 0.68 0.61 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.54 0.75 0.74 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.67
MLP char, W 0.75 0.55 0.71 0.68 0.59 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.56 0.76 0.72 0.50 0.72 0.48 0.67
CNN+GRU, T1* 0.43 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.00 0.33 0.04 0.34 − 0.00 0.00 − 0.04 0.38 0.01 0.27
CNN+GRU, T2 0.76 0.27 0.67 0.68 0.09 0.77 0.43 0.66 − 0.00 0.00 − 0.64 0.75 0.50 0.74
CNN+GRU, T3 0.69 0.23 0.61 0.43 0.03 0.76 0.08 0.63 − 0.00 0.00 − 0.18 0.70 0.14 0.64
LSTM, T2 0.70 0.40 0.66 0.67 0.19 0.71 0.42 0.64 − 0.00 0.02 − 0.27 0.68 0.15 0.69
LR word, T1 0.50 0.30 0.42 0.37 0.04 0.48 0.18 0.44 − 0.01 0.02 − 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.30
Table 8: F1-scores on the “hate” class from attacks and mitigation.
Attack: A; Mitigations: AT = adversarial training, SC = spell-checker, RW = removing whitespace (character-models only)
Expected pattern is attack reducing score and mitigation restoring it; deviations highlighted and discussed in sections 4.1–4.3.
4.1 Word changes
Word-modelsweremore susceptible to leetspeak than typos, whereas
no clear difference can be found in character-models. In addition,
word-modelsweremuchmore vulnerable to both aacks than character-
models. Adversarial training had a major positive effect on perfor-
mance against both aacks, but its effect was larger on the leets-
peak aack. is is unsurprising given the deterministic nature of
the leetspeak algorithm. e determinacy also indicates that the
leetspeak aack could easily be mitigated by a counter-algorithm
transforming numbers into corresponding characters.
4.2 Word boundary changes
Neither character-model was affected by the whitespace insertion
aack, but the performance of both was markedly decreased by
whitespace removal. We suggest this may be due to the fact that
whitespace is involved in the beginnings and ends ofwords. Unlike
adding whitespace, removing it abolishes all n-grams concerning
word boundaries, which may be especially relevant for classifica-
tion.
All word-models were completely broken by white space re-
moval, and severely hindered by whitespace addition. As expected,
adversarial training had no impact on whitespace removal. Re-
sistance to whitespace addition, in contrast, was improved, and
reached levels close to the baseline, differing from it only 6 − 10%.
Overall, removing whitespace was muchmore effective than its ad-
dition for all models, both as an aack and in avoiding adversarial
training as mitigation.
Character-models peformed slightly worse when trained with-
out spaces, but not much, the largest drop in F1-score being 3%.
We conclude that removing spaces in pre-processing during both
training and testing makes character-based models resistant to to-
kenization aacks with only aminor reduction in predictive power.
No comparablemitigation exists forword-models, where word bound-
ary removal will force the text to be tokenized as a single <unk>.
4.3 Word appending
Unlike other aacks, word appending affected character- andword-
models comparably. Words from the non-hate class of the training
set had a systematically larger impact than commonEnglish words,
but the difference was very minor (1 − 2%) on character-models.
e largest difference was observed on the LSTM model, where
non-hate words had almost twice the effect of commonwords (0.27
vs. 0.15).
e only model not affected by either appending aack was the
three-class word-based LR model from Davidson et al. [7], trained
on T1. We aribute this result to the fact that the major non-hate
class of this dataset was the “offensive” class. Common English
words or words from the “neither” class rarely indicate offensive
speech, making it unlikely for the hate speech to be classified as
such. is data imbalance also likely explains the negative effect of
adversarial training, which was not observed on any other model.
Adversarial training worked very well on all two-class models,
reaching predictive power close to the baseline. e effect was the
smallest with CNN+GRU trained on T1*, leaving 16% behind the
baseline with adversarial training. e dataset T1* is drawn from
T1 by combining offensive and non-offensive ordinary speech into
a single class. As offensive speech takes the overwhelming major-
ity of T1, T1* is highly imbalanced. We therefore expect adversar-
ial training to result in the appended words to associate with the
“non-hate” class more readily than the “hate” class, which would
account for its limited success in mitigation.
4.4 Adding “love”
Finally, we present the results from our aack combining the two
most powerful approaches we experimented with: whitespace re-
moval and word appending.
Whitespace removal turns the sentence into a single <¡unk¿>,
making the classification entirely dependent on themodel’s predic-
tion of this particular token. Models might behave differently with
respect to it, and hence the effects of whitespace removal can be un-
certain. is problem can be remedied by adding words strongly
indicative of the non-hate class, effectively forcing the model to
prefer it.
Furthermore, instead of using a long list of non-hateful words,
we minimize the hindrance on readability by appending the text
with only one word: “love”. We choose this word because, intu-
itively, it is likely to negatively correlate with hate speech. Our
results support this hypothesis.
As expected, the aack completely broke all word-models, and
significantly hindered character-models (Table 9). Based on the
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Model (data, classes) Original “Love”
LR char (W, 2) 0.75 0.52
MLP char (W, 2) 0.75 0.55
CNN+GRU (T1*, 2) 0.36 0.01
CNN+GRU (T2, 2) 0.79 0.00
CNN+GRU (T3, 2) 0.78 0.00
LSTM (T2, 2) 0.74 0.00
LR word (T1, 3) 0.50 0.00
Table 9: F1-scores (macro) from the attack of removingword
boundaries and adding “love”.
word appending results, the performance on character-modelswould
decrease with more appended non-hateful words. Since the origi-
nal message can relatively easily be recovered, and the single un-
related word has a minimal effect on readability (assuming it to
be separable from the rest by the reader), we consider this aack
highly successful against state-of-the-art hate speech classification.
We additionally experimented with Google Perspective, using
example sentences from Hosseini et al. [11], reproduced below.
S1: Climate change is happening and it’s not changing in our
favor. If you think differently you’re an idiot.
S2: ey’re stupid, it’s geing warmer, we should enjoy it
while it lasts
S3: ey are liberal idiots who are uneducated
S4: idiots. backward thinking people. nationalists. not accept-
ing facts. susceptible to lies.
S5: ey are stupid and ignorant with no class
S6: It’s stupid and wrong
S7: If they voted for Hilary they are idiots
S8: Anyone who voted for Trump is a moron
S9: Screw you trump supporters
Hosseini et al. provide examples of introducing manual typos,
punctuation and spaces in each sentence, and demonstrate its ef-
fects on Google Perspective. We applied the same modifications
to the same example sentences, but received much higher toxicity
scores. is indicates that Perspective has been updated, and now
performs beer on adversarial data. Nevertheless, we managed to
reduce the toxicity score to below 0.40 on all example sentences
with our aack of removing word boundaries and adding “love”
(Table 10). is number is Perspective’s upper limit for the label
“unlikely to be considered toxic”.
5 DISCUSSION
We evaluated the performance of seven state-of-the art hate speech
classifiers presented in prior work. We showed that these tech-
niques work roughly equally with different datasets, provided that
the training and testing are based on the same dataset. However,
we identified three main deficiencies in the models: (i) lack of ef-
fective transferability across datasets, (ii) conflation of hate speech
and offensive ordinary speech, and (iii) susceptibility to simple text
modification aacks. e first two arise from the problematicity of
the concept of “hate speech”, which can differ across datasets, and
may or may not include all offensive or inappropriate material de-
pending on the context.
Sentence Original
Modified
[11] “Love”
S1 0.95 0.94 (0.20) 0.35
S2 0.92 0.38 (0.02) 0.37
S3 0.98 0.79 (0.15) 0.37
S4 0.95 0.90 (0.17) 0.37
S5 0.97 0.53 (0.11) 0.37
S6 0.88 0.82 (0.17) 0.35
S7 0.99 0.70 (0.12) 0.15
S8 0.96 0.64 (0.13) 0.35
S9 0.90 0.78 (0.17) 0.35
Table 10: Google Perspective “toxicity” scores for S1–S9.
Scores from manual modifications [11] in third column; re-
sults reported in the original paper in parentheses.
Our aacksweremuchmore effective against word-models than
character-models. Most effective was the very simple “love” aack,
which managed to completely break all word-models, and severely
hinder the performance of character-models. We further demon-
strated the aack’s ability to reduce Google Perspective’s toxicity
score to below the threshold of 0.40 in all our example sentences.
In this section we present some consequences for future work
that, we suggest, are implied by our findings.
5.1 Transferability and false positives
No two-class model performed well on other datasets, and all of
them classify most offensive ordinary speech as hateful. Manual
experimentation showed that Google Perspective functions simi-
larily, as adding curse words to otherwise benign text drastically
increases the toxicity score. ese results are indicative of two re-
lated problems.
First, the standards of ground-truth labeling likely varied across
different datasets. For example, catagories like “sexism/racism”
(T2) might be appropriate for some comments which are not “per-
sonal aacks” (W), or vice versa. is problem may not be fatal to
institutions that wish to target particular subtypes of hate speech,
as long as appropriate labels are available for sufficient training
data. Our cross-application results further indicate that, for classi-
fication performance, model type maers less than dataset. How-
ever, the problem is more serious for the task of more general hate
speech detection, as undertaken in law enforcement or academic
research.
Second, with the exception of Davidson et al. [7], the distinction
between hate speech and more generally “inappropriate” material
is typically not made clear. Google Perspective does not distin-
guish between hate speech and offensive speech, characterizing
their “toxicity” metric as the means to identify a “rude, disrespect-
ful or unreasonable comment that is likely to make you leave a
discussion”.8 Hence, the problem is not only that offensive ordi-
nary speech can constitute a false positive. Rather, it is not clear
where the boundary between true and false positives should lie.
We can, however, assume that a datapoint constitutes a genuine
false positive at leastwhen the only reason it is allocated to the hate
8hps://www.perspectiveapi.com
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class is because it contains curse words not used to offend any par-
ticular person or group. For future work, we therefore recommend
experimenting with methods that discard curse words at least on
the unigram level.
5.2 Evasion attacks
Our results show that character-models are much more resistant
to simple text-transformation aacks against hate speech classifi-
cation. While this is not theoretically surprising, to our knowledge
it has not been taken into account in prior work on the topic. In
particular, space-removal during training has only a minor nega-
tive effect on performance, mitigates all tokenization aacks, and
is only available for character-models. Further, while we received
the best results overall on CNN+GRU, the simple character-models
fared reasonably well in comparison toword-based DNNs. We con-
clude that using character-models instead of word-models is the
most effective protection against our aacks.
Nevertheless, all models were susceptible to the word append-
ing aack. is was expected, since the other aacks are built
around the transformation of word identities, but the appending
aack has a different basis. It takes advantage of a fundamental
vulnerability of all classification systems: they make their decision
based on prevalence instead of presence. e status of some text as
hateful is a maer of it containing some hateful material; whether
this material constitutes the majority of the text is irrelevant. Clas-
sification, in contrast, looks at the entire sentence and makes its
decision based on which class is more represented on average. In
principle, any text classification system can be forced to make a
particular prediction by simply adding enough material indicative
of one class.
We can re-phrase the problem by referring to the distinction be-
tween classification and detection, where the laer consist in find-
ing some features of a relevant sort, regardless of the prevalence
of other material in the datapoint. In particular, we suggest re-
conceptualizing hate speech detection as anomaly detection, where
hate speech constitutes an anomalous variant of ordinary speech.
As our aacks target commonly used model architectures in
text classification, they are generalizable beyond the task of hate
speech detection. Possible other aack scenarios involve e.g. fool-
ing sentiment analysis, author anonymization [2, 3], or avoiding
content-based text classification to escape censorship.
On the other hand, our aacks only concern textual content, and
hence do not hinder hate speech detection methods based around
meta-features concerning user behavior [24]. Given both the sim-
plicity and effectiveness of our aacks, focusing on meta-level ap-
proaches instead of text classification can be a useful direction for
future research.
6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
For our replication and cross-application, we only used freely avail-
able online datasets and models. We collected no data ourselves,
and none of our tests involved human subjects. Since our origi-
nal code constitutes a series of aacks, we do not provide it open
source. However, wewillmake it available for bonafide researchers
to facilitate reproducibility.
7 RELATED WORK
In their survey on hate speech detection, Schmidt and Wiegand
[24] categorize the features used in prior research into eight cate-
gories:
(i) simple surface features
(ii) word generalization
(iii) sentiment analysis
(iv) lexical resources
(v) linguistic features
(vi) knowledge-based features
(vii) meta-information
(viii) multimodal information
Focusing only on linguistic features, we disregard (vii)–(viii).
Of simple surface features, character n-grams have been argued
to perform beer than word n-grams, since they can detect simi-
larities between different spelling variants [16]. ese results are
in line with ours. Word generalization has traditionally involved
word clustering, i.e. assimilating similar words [26], and more re-
cently word embeddings. However, the superiority of embeddings
over n-grams is not empirically aested, as both character and
word n-grams have performed beer when compared with embed-
dings in hate speech classification [20].
DNNs typically include a word embedding layer in the begin-
ning of the network, which is also true of the models we experi-
mented with (LSTM, CNN+GRU). Prior to training, the embedding
layer can be initialized randomly, or initialized by pre-trained em-
beddings like word2vec [19] or GloVe [21] Of the models we used,
the LSTM [1] embeddings were randomly initialized, whereas the
CNN+GRU [29] embeddings were initialized with Google embed-
dings trained on a news corpus.9
Sentiment analysis can be incorporated to the process either as
a prior filter [9], or as a feature used directly for hate speech clas-
sification. Of the models we experimented with, the three-class
LR-model of Davidson et al. [7] includes sentiment as a textual
feature. One important domain of future work involves applying
our aacks on state-of-the-art sentiment classifiers to see if they
can be broken to the same extent with simple text transformation
methods.
e remaining (linguistic) feature-types (iv)–(vi) consist ofmore
traditional, oen hand-craed, features and rules. Lists of hateful
words are available online,10 and can be appended to other features
in aid of hate speech detection. As stand-alone features, their per-
formance is weak in comparison to n-grams [20, 24]. Of linguistic
features applied to hate speech classification, the most common
have been part-of-speech tags and dependency relations [5, 6, 20].
Knowledge-based approaches based on automatic reasoning can
help in detecting particular paerns related to hate speech [8], but
do not scale beyond those paerns.
A general trend within NLP in recent years has been a shi to-
ward using DNNs as opposed to more traditional keyword- and
rule-based methods, or traditional machine learning approaches
building on simple sparse features like n-grams [10]. However,
our aack results indicate that reconsidering some older methods
9hps://github.com/mmihaltz/word2vec-GoogleNews-vectors
10e most extensive of such lists are currently found in hps://www.hatebase.org/.
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could be useful, as they may be more resistant toward the word ap-
pending aack. In particular, keyword-based approaches are not
vulnerable to the class asymmetry problem, as the mere presence
of hate-indicative keywords is relevant, irrespective of the pres-
ence of other words.
Outside of hate speech detection, text obfuscation -based eva-
sion aacks have been conducted to avoid spam detection, espe-
cially Bayesian models [25]. In particular, our word appending at-
tack bears a close similarity to what have been called “good word
aacks” on spam filters [14, 30]. Here, the spammer injects words
that are treated as indicative of legitimate text by the filter, with
the goal of flipping themodel’s class prediction. Despite these well-
known aacks on spam detection, analogical cases for hate speech
have so far been neglected in the literature. We hope to alleviate
this problem.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our replication and cross-application results suggest that model
architecture has no major impact on classifier performance. Ad-
ditionally, the simplest model (LR-char) performed comparably to
more complex models, indicating that the positive effect of using
more complex architectures is only minor. Cross-application fur-
ther demonstrated that model complexity did not help to improve
scalability across datasets. Instead, the problem stems from the
labels themselves, the grounds of which can differ between the
datasets.
We therefore suggest that futurework should focus on the datasets
instead of themodels. More work is needed to compare the linguis-
tic features indicative of different kinds of hate speech (racism, sex-
ism, personal aacks etc.), and the differences between hateful and
merely offensive speech.
e effectiveness of our simple aacks is indicative of the vul-
nerability of proposed hate speech classifiers based on state-of-the-
art machine learning approaches. Future work should take such at-
tacks into consideration in addition to mere classification accuracy.
In particular, we demonstrated the superiority of character-models
against aacks, which provides a significant case in favor of using
them in real-world applications.
e appending aack presents a fundamental problemwith treat-
ing hate speech detection as classification. e classes are asym-
metrical in that ordinary speech can be transformed into hate speech
by adding hateful material, but hate speech should not be trans-
formed into ordinary speech by adding benign material. is asym-
metricity is not built into classification, but it should be a founda-
tional principle of hate speech detection. We recommend focusing
on this problem in future research, and seeking detection methods
that are not based on mere classification. One possibility is to rein-
troduce more traditional keyword-based approaches, where only
hate-indicative words are sought, disregarding the presence or ab-
sence of other words.
Additionally, building on our adversarial training experiments,
we suggest training data augmentation as a method to help classi-
fication remain more resistant against appending aacks. is is a
well-known approach to making classifiers more resistant to noise.
Adding benign text to hate speech datapoints helps the classifier
find those aspects that are relevant for the text belonging to the
hate class, and decreases the effect of irrelevant word-class corre-
lations.
In summary, we make four recommendations for future work
on hate speech detection:
• Focus should be on the datasets instead of the models, and
more qualitative work is needed to understand different
categories the fall under the umbrella of “hate speech”.
• Simple character-models are preferable toword-basedmod-
els (including DNNs) with respect to resisting simple eva-
sion methods based on text transformation.
• Detection methods should not be vulnerable to the asym-
metricity between the classes, which invites using meth-
ods that only target the presence of hate-indicative fea-
tures and remain indifferent to other features.
• Training data augmentation can reduce the effect of be-
nign words on classification.
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